DOSMUKHAMEDOV: The $1.45 billion condo plan that still lacks public safeguards

DOSMUKHAMEDOV: The $1.45 billion condo plan that still lacks public safeguards
Photo: Jarryd Jäger
| Sitka Media Guest Columnist

Since Prime Minister Mark Carney and Premier David Eby announced their Canada-British Columbia housing partnership on June 18, one question has remained unanswered: where are the safeguards that would allow Canadians to verify whether a publicly backed initiative involving approximately $1.45 billion in potential spending and financing is being administered fairly, independently and in the public interest?

That question has acquired new urgency. On September 22, Premier Eby called an early provincial election, with British Columbians now scheduled to vote on October 24. The government is therefore asking voters for a renewed mandate while important details of one of its significant housing initiatives remain unavailable for public scrutiny.

Eby has framed the early election around the deteriorating relationship with the United States, describing the threat posed by President Donald Trump as an “existential moment” for British Columbia. The challenge may indeed be serious. But an external crisis does not suspend a government’s obligation to account for its own decisions at home. If anything, a government asking voters for a renewed mandate in exceptional circumstances should be especially willing to demonstrate how major commitments of public resources will be governed.

The two governments have asked Canadians to trust a large discretionary initiative before publicly explaining the valuation methodology, the rules governing transaction-level disclosure, or the program-specific conflict-of-interest safeguards that would allow that trust to be tested. Accountability does not begin after public money has been committed. It begins before the first acquisition is approved.

Carney and Eby have presented the initiative as a plan to purchase and convert more than 2,200 vacant condominium units into affordable housing. Premier Eby has compared the approach to buying goods at a liquidation sale. But that analogy only works if the public can examine the terms of sale.

In a genuine liquidation, the goods, the prices and the sellers are known. Here, Canadians still do not know how individual units will be valued, how purchase prices will be determined, or what independent review will govern those decisions.

That places a particular responsibility on Premier Eby, who has personally defended the program as an opportunity to acquire housing at discounted prices, potentially below construction cost. But a bargain asserted by government is not necessarily a bargain demonstrated to taxpayers.

If the Premier wants British Columbians to accept the liquidation analogy, his government should disclose the evidence necessary to test it: the valuation rules, proposed purchase prices and safeguards governing which properties are purchased, from which entities and at what price.

That is the real issue — not whether government should ever purchase private housing stock. Under the right conditions, that can be a sensible policy tool. The question is whether this program has been designed with safeguards that let taxpayers verify those conditions have been met. On the public record, the two governments have not yet provided enough information for Canadians to make that assessment independently.

The political context makes transparency particularly important. Public reporting about political fundraising attended by figures from British Columbia’s real-estate industry has raised questions in Parliament about the appearance of proximity between political relationships and housing policy.

None of this proves that fundraising influenced government decisions, nor should it be taken as evidence of wrongdoing. It does, however, reinforce the need for transparent procedures capable of demonstrating that purchase decisions are independent of political relationships — rather than simply asking the public to accept that they are.

Supporters of the program argue that purchasing completed units below construction cost could provide good value for taxpayers while expanding affordable housing more quickly than building from scratch. That argument deserves to be taken seriously. If the governments can acquire quality housing at demonstrably advantageous prices, taxpayers may well benefit.

But the words if and demonstrably matter. A claim of value is not the same as evidence of value. Democratic accountability exists because trust alone is not enough: independent review, public disclosure and auditable decision-making transform assurances into evidence.

That principle was tested in July 2026, when the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics adjourned debate on a Conservative motion seeking further scrutiny of the program. Whether or not one agrees with the motion, additional scrutiny of a publicly backed initiative of this scale should be viewed as an ordinary feature of democratic accountability — not something to be avoided.

Those central transparency questions remain unresolved. As of this writing, I have found no publicly announced completed acquisition under the program, no published valuation methodology and no publicly disclosed program-specific conflict-of-interest framework — more than three months after the announcement. The governments said in June that they would formalize the partnership over the coming months and begin bringing affordable housing back to the market by this fall.

The election call makes disclosure more, not less, important. British Columbians are now being asked to assess the government’s record and its plans for another mandate. The international dispute dominating the campaign should not obscure questions that lie entirely within the provincial government’s own control.

Washington cannot publish British Columbia’s valuation methodology. Donald Trump cannot establish its conflict-of-interest safeguards. And the Canada-US trade dispute cannot tell British Columbians who may ultimately sell properties to government, at what price, or according to what independent valuation.

Those are questions for British Columbia’s government to answer.

Whatever judgment voters ultimately make, they should have the information necessary to evaluate a major publicly backed housing initiative on its merits. The resulting program must include the valuation, disclosure and conflict-of-interest safeguards described here — not merely the financing mechanics.

The omissions to date are not arguments against housing policy. They are arguments for stronger governance — and the longer they persist unaddressed, the harder it becomes to accept that they are simply a consequence of a program still being finalized.

The safeguards required are straightforward. Every acquisition should be supported by an independent appraisal or valuation review conducted by a qualified professional with no relationship to the seller or the government agency responsible for the acquisition.

Every completed transaction should be publicly disclosed in a standardized format, including the developer or seller, the property or an appropriate identifying reference, the asking price, purchase price, appraisal basis and approving authority, subject to legitimate privacy or security limitations. Decision-makers should disclose any actual or potential conflicts of interest.

Finally, the federal and provincial components of the program should each undergo an independent performance audit after the first year, with the federal findings reported to Parliament and the provincial findings reported to the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia.

None of these measures would prevent governments from purchasing housing if the program is well designed. They would simply allow Canadians to determine whether it is.

British Columbians will now spend the next month hearing arguments about threats from outside their borders. They are equally entitled to answers about decisions being made inside them.

That is the standard public money should meet before — not after — the first acquisition is completed.

Yerzhan Dosmukhamedov holds a doctoral degree in law from the University of Oxford, where he was a Senior Associate Member of St Antony’s College. He specializes in constitutional and international law and writes on governance and accountability.

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